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ABSTRACT   
The paper analyses the peculiar structure of the rare earth elements (REE) 
industry, a sector dominated by China, and the global implications of 
current upheavals within the sector, especially as they concern South 
Africa’s (re)emerging rare earths production. REEs are a hitherto obscure 
group of metals that have now assumed global significance. They are 
especially critical to modern high-strength magnets and constitute vital 
inputs for a growing range of mass consumer, ‘green’ technology and 
military applications. It is important to understand that REEs altogether 
comprise 17 different metals which, although found together in various 
combinations, differ in relative abundance and breadth of possible 
applications. There are therefore large variations in prices and criticality of 
supply between the different elements.  
 
The Chinese rare earths industry has secured a 97% share of upstream 
production by means of aggressive pricing, backed by state support and 
technology transfer. Beijing is now attempting to consolidate the industry, 
crack down on illegal mining and restrict and enforce export and production 
quotas. Official explanations stress renewed concern for environmental 
issues and the protection of scarce resources from over-exploitation. Also 
significant, however, is a policy of deliberately using export restrictions to 
leverage non-Chinese prices, in order to induce foreign downstream 
producers to relocate production to China. This process is beginning; 
although there are also two other forms of international response. First, 
there is demand destruction either through increased efficiency in REE 
usage, substitution or recycling of rare earths. Secondly – and most widely 
known – are attempts to restart REE supply chains outside China. South 
Africa is in the forefront of these efforts through two, globally significant, 
extractive projects. The refurbished Steenkampskraal thorium and REE 
mine may be the first non-Chinese new producer to come online, in 2012–
2013. The Zandkopsdrift development in Northern Cape is less advanced, 
but is among the largest prospective new REE mines. Both are joint 
ventures between Western junior mining companies and East Asian 
parastatals, respectively from China and Korea. Significant environmental 
risks seem inherent in the extraction and separation of REEs, especially 
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from thorium waste, although apparently this has not reached the public 
consciousness in the areas immediately around the South African mines. If 
these dangers can be avoided or minimised, the new rare earths mines could 
make a small but significant positive developmental impact at local as well 
as national level. 
 
The author is a PhD student in politics at the University of Bristol.  He 
holds a BA in Comparative American Studies from the University of 
Warwick and an MA in Global Studies from the Albert-Ludwigs University 
of Freiburg.  His doctoral research concerns the impact of the rise of China 
on the global developmental political economy, centring on extractive 
industries in Africa and Latin America  
E-mail: nickjepson81@gmail.com  
 
 
CCS discussion papers should contribute to the academic debate 
on China’s global rise and the consequences thereof for African 
development. We do therefore explicitly invite scholars from 
Africa, China, or elsewhere, to use this format for advanced papers 
that are ready for an initial publication, not least to obtain input 
from other colleagues in the field. Discussion papers should thus 
be seen as work in progress, exposed to (and ideally stimulating) 
policy-relevant discussion based on academic standards.  
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. 
© Centre for Chinese Studies and SAIIA, March 2012 
 
 
5  
Contents 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS     6 
PREFACE          7 
INTRODUCTION        8 
THE RARE EARTHS SECTOR      16 
EVOLUTION TOWARDS THE CURRENT DOMINANCE  
OF CHINA        16 
THE RISE OF CHINA’S RARE EARTHS SECTOR   17 
GLOBAL REACTION TO CHINESE MONOPOLY    22 
BEYOND CHINA: THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR RARE  
EARTHS        23 
SOUTH AFRICA’S RE-EMERGING RARE EARTHS  
INDUSTRY         26 
STEENKAMPSKRAAL       27 
ZANDKOPSDRIFT       30 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE RARE EARTH INDUSTRY  
IN SOUTH AFRICA        30 
CONCLUSIONS        33 
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS      33 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA OF THE  
CHINESE MONOPOLY       34 
REFERENCES        35 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS  
BEE  Black Economic Empowerment 
GWMG  Canada’s Great Western Minerals Group Ltd  
CREO  Critical rare earth oxide 
DoE  US Department of Energy 
Dy   dysprosium 
Eu   europium 
FCC  Fuel cracking catalyst 
GQRE Ganzhou Qiandong Rare Earth (group) 
HREE  Heavy rare earth element 
kg/t   Kilograms per tonne 
Kores  Korea Resources Corporation  
LREE  Light rare earth element 
MoST  Government of China Ministry of Science and Technology 
Nd   neodymium 
NdFeB ,  neodymium-iron-boron 
REE  Rare earth element 
REO  Rare earth oxide 
ROW  Rest of world [outside China] 
Tb   terbium 
Vale  Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
Y   yttrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
The analysis of this paper offers insights into the mining of rare earths, an area that 
is usually loaded with secrecy and prone to media speculation. The monopoly of 
China on processed rare earths and the current plans to (re-)open two rare earths 
mines in South Africa – which used to be a world market leader in rare earths in the 
1960s – merit a thorough analysis. 
The topic of this research is valuable to analysts and policy makers from at least two 
key perspectives. Firstly, it is worthwhile exploring the reasons for China’s 
domination in the sector and analysing the policies that inform its exploitation of 
rare earths minerals. Secondly, it illustrates the need for a better understanding of 
global dynamics when making costly long-term decisions on investments such as 
(re)building a mining industry for rare earth minerals in competition with China. 
This paper is a parallel publication by the South African Institute of International 
Affairs and the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University. It was written 
in the context of an internship of Nicholas Jepson at both institutions between July 
and September 2011. During his stay in South Africa, Nicholas conducted field 
work, including at the prospective mining sites, in the provinces of Western and 
Northern Cape in September 2011. 
 
Dr Sven Grimm and Dr Kathryn Sturman 
Stellenbosch/Cape Town, January 2012 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the past two years a group of 17 little-known and exotically named metals has 
been attracting serious public interest. There has been global scramble for new 
sources of the materials, fevered speculation driving price rises, and fears for the 
economic and geo-strategic security of Western nations. The reasons for this 
upheaval are complex but for many Western journalists, investors and politicians, 
may be reduced to one word: China.   The narrative usually attached to discussion of 
rare earths is one of aggressive Chinese mercantilism in the service of geo-political 
goals and apparent Western complacency and vulnerability. It resonates with broader 
and more general fears in the West of the threat posed by a rising China.   
Most articles on so-called REEs point out a salient fact: that, having forced almost 
all competitors out of the industry through deployment of the familiar Chinese 
competitive advantages of low labour and environmental costs, China now accounts 
for 97%1  of the world’s rare earth mining.  It enjoys similarly dominance at all 
points of the supply chain up to the manufacturing stage (see Figure 1). China 
completed its hold over the extraction of rare earths about a decade ago, a time 
when almost all major non-Chinese mines had closed. Chief among them was 
Mountain Pass, on the California-Nevada border, which shut down in 2002 due to 
low REE prices and new environmental restrictions. At that time the loss of the US 
REE industry seemingly could be written off as a minor episode – the relocation of 
the dirty and unprofitable end of a minor and unimportant industry that employed 
few people. Today, the picture has greatly changed. Frantic efforts to restart 
production outside China are currently under way.  
Figure 1: Main stages of the rare earth production process  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rare Earth Metals in the Defense [sic] Supply Chain', United States Government 
Accountability Office, Washington D.C, 2010 
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Increasingly, REEs are produced for use in high performance magnets, vital to 
various products for which global demand has skyrocketed over the past decade.2  
These include mass produced goods, for example DVD players and hard drives, and 
more high-technology consumer items such as iPads and ‘smart’ phones (see Figure 
2). The West has woken up to the importance of REEs, however, mainly due to 
their rapidly increasing use in two sectors of vital future geo-political significance. 
The first is the manufacture of many ‘clean tech’ items such as wind turbines, hybrid 
and electric car batteries, and magnetic levitation (‘maglev’) trains, at present 
impractical without the use of rare earth-derived magnets. Secondly and of even 
more pressing concern to many governments, particularly that of the United States, 
is the acquisition of REE for the production of much of their high-technology 
military equipment, such as armoured vehicle navigation systems, submarine engines 
and missile guidance systems, and even for refining jet fuel. 
Table 1: The importance of rare earths: key applications for the 17 elements 
Dysprosium: Nuclear reactors, electric vehicles, lasers, future green tech. 
Holmium: 
Generates strongest magnetic fields currently possible, lasers, 
nuclear reactors. 
Erbium: Fibre optics, lasers. 
Thulium: Few current applications, does not occur naturally. 
Ytterbium: Solar cells, optics, crystals. 
Lutetium: 
Petroleum refining, possible cancer treatment, x-rays, computer 
memory. 
Yttrium: 
Phosphors, many alloys, turbochargers, prosthetics, cancer and 
arthritis treatment. 
Scandium: Aluminium alloys for aerospace, guns.  
Lanthanum: 
Hybrid batteries, computers, fuel cells, electronic vacuums, 
petroleum cracking. 
Cerium: 
Glass polishing, solar panels, light-emitting diodes (LEDs), 
catalytic converters. 
Praseodymium: 
Aircraft engine alloys, super magnets, Computerised Axial 
Tomography (CAT) scan machines, fibre optics. 
Neodymium: Electric cars, wind turbines, air conditioning, hard drives. 
Samarium: Permanent magnets for defence applications, cancer drugs. 
Europium: 
Red and green colours in TV sets, control rods for nuclear 
reactors, alloys. 
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Gadolinium: 
High strength alloys, microwave ovens, CDs, computer 
memory, MRI machines, nuclear reactors. 
Terbium: Fuel cells, lasers, high technology audio, alloys.  
Source: Hammond CR, ‘Section 4; The Elements’, in Lide D (ed.), CRC Handbook of 
Chemistry and Physics (89th ed). Boca Raton: CRC Press/Taylor and Francis, 2009 
 
Along with Australia and North America, Southern and East Africa are among the 
most promising regions for new sources of rare earths (see Table 1). South Africa in 
particular appears to have great potential for rare earth extraction. Construction of 
two new mines in the Western and Northern Cape provinces has already started.  
The rare earth industry will never become a major driver of national development, 
but the new mines should bring socio-economic benefits to the communities around 
them, which are among the most disadvantaged in the country.  
In addition, work has started to establish rare earth separation plants (which turn 
mined ores into oxides) in South Africa, which may position the country as a future 
regional hub for processing rare earth ores mined elsewhere in Africa. The 
opportunity to gain a foothold in a sector of such global strategic importance is 
undoubtedly attractive. There are concerns, however, surrounding the environmental 
impact of the nascent industry. Rare earth-producing regions in China have been 
devastated by mining and processing operations that have generated acidic waste 
water, harmful gases, contaminated groundwater and radioactive tailings. Avoiding 
such deleterious effects in South Africa will be a major challenge.3   
Table 2:  Current rare earth projects in Africa 
Project Company Location 
Steenkampskraal 
Great Western Minerals 
Group/ Ganzhou Qiandong 
Rare Earth 
South Africa  
Zandkopsdrift Frontier Rare Earths/Kores South Africa 
Wigu Hill Montero Mining/Kores Tanzania 
Ngualla Peak Resources Tanzania 
Kangankunde Lynas Corp Malawi 
Salambidwe Globe Metals and Mining Malawi/Mozambique border 
Machinga 
Globe Metals and 
Mining/Resource Star 
Malawi 
Sangwe Mkango Resources Malawi 
Nkomba Hill Rare Earth 
International/African 
Zambia 
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Consolidated Resources 
Lofdal Namibia Rare Earths Namibia 
Hoarusib Avonlea Minerals Namibia 
Gakara Southern Crown Burundi 
Mrima Hill Pacific Wildcat Resources Kenya 
Xiluvo Southern Crown Mozambique 
Mount Muambe 
Globe Metals and 
Mining/East China Minerals  
Mozambique 
Malilongue 
Kimberly Rare Earths/Great 
Western Mining 
Mozambique 
Longonjo Black Fire Minerals Angola 
Moijabana Impact Minerals Botswana 
TRE Tantalus Rare Earths Madagascar 
Source: Compiled by Author 
 
As regards downstream REE production, the US continues to hold a near-
monopoly in fuel cracking catalysts (FCCs), an important end use of REEs, but 
relatively unproblematic in terms of supply constraints. Rare earth oxides (REOs) 
are required for refining or ‘cracking’ crude oil into most kinds of petroleum-based 
fuels, hence demand for REEs as catalysts largely follows that for oil. Increasingly, 
however, further demand is likely to come from the greater exploitation of non-
traditional sources of crude oil such as those from Canadian tar sands and shale gas, 
which require larger amounts of REEs to complete the cracking process.4  Within 
this sector generally, however, there seems little fear of supply bottlenecks. The rare 
earths mainly used in catalytic converters and as FCCs are cerium and lanthanum. 
These two elements have perhaps the widest range of end uses of any of the REEs 
and in relatively high demand, with cerium alone projected to make up one-third of 
total REE sales by 2015.5 Balancing this, however, is the fact that most REE 
deposits contain large quantities of both, with almost all the newly discovered non-
Chinese deposits having heavy concentrations of the two. Indeed, supplies of cerium 
and lanthanum are expected to move to permanent surplus when the first wave of 
new non-Chinese mines opens in 2012–20136 (See Table 3). 
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Table 3: Selected rare earths and projected critical supply problems for oxides 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Lanthanum O O ✔ ✔✔ ✔✔ ✔✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Cerium O O ✔ ✔✔ ✔✔✔ ✔✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Neodymium ✘ ✘ O O ✔ ✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Europium ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘ ✘ O ✔✔ ✔✔ 
Terbium ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ O ✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Dysprosium ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ O ✔ 
Yttrium ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘ ✔ ✔✔ 
CREO  ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
 
Supply as percentage of demand: ✘✘= 50–74% ✘= 75–94%  O = 95–
105%  ✔ = 106–125%: ✔✔ = 126–150% ✔✔✔ ≥ 151% 
CREO = oxides of Nd, Eu, Tb, Dy & Y  
If production quotas are strictly enforced transition points will be later than those 
indicated above. 
Note: The table assumes a minimum Chinese annual REO production of 118 
900 tonnes (the total for 2010)  
 
Source: Hatch GP, Critical Rare Earths: Global Supply and Demand Projections and the 
Leading Contenders for New Sources of Supply. Carpentersville, Illinois: Technology Metals 
Research, LLC, 2011 
 
Until very recently catalysts made up the largest share of the REE end-use market. 
Already, however, this sector has been overtaken by that for permanent magnet 
manufacturing. Rare earth magnets consist of alloys of REEs such as neodymium, 
praseodymium, samarium, dysprosium, and – to a limited extent – terbium, with 
other ferro-magnetic metals, usually iron or cobalt. These combinations produce 
permanent magnets with the highest-strength magnetic fields currently achievable. 
In consequence, although substitutes may sometimes be available, rare earth 
magnets make for far more efficient design. For example laptop computers would 
be half as large again and twice as heavy as current units 7 without the use of rare 
earths, 
The REE magnet market is already large, particularly in consumer electronics such 
as hard disk drives and smart phones. The most important future component of 
demand for REEs, however, which is expected to drive double digit growth in this 
sector (see Table 4), is the use of rare earth magnets in green technology 
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applications. The two most important of these are in electric and hybrid vehicles, 
and next-generation wind turbines. Although a small quantity of a particular metal is 
a feature of demand for many REEs, in this case volumes tend to be much larger, 
with the manufacture of each Toyota Prius hybrid car, for example, requiring 1kg of 
neodymium and 100–200g of dysprosium. Wind turbines have even greater 
requirements: at a conservative estimate each megawatt of generating capacity8 
needs150–200kg of neodymium and praseodymium as well as 20–35kg of 
dysprosium. The growing market for electric scooters in developing countries, 
particularly China, is also potentially important as a source of demand for REE 
magnets. Scooters require less REE than electrically powered cars, but their potential 
sales may be much greater.  
 
Table 4: Projected demand 2010–2020 for rare earths by end use 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Lanthanum O O ✔ ✔✔ ✔✔ ✔✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Cerium O O ✔ ✔✔ ✔✔✔ ✔✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Neodymium ✘ ✘ O O ✔ ✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Eurpoium ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘ ✘ O ✔✔ ✔✔ 
Terbium ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ O ✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Dysprosium ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ O ✔ 
Yttrium ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘✘ ✘ ✔ ✔✔ 
CREO  ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔✔ ✔✔✔ 
Note: Totals may not sum exactly due to rounding 
Source: Otto E, ‘Rare Earth Metals’, Cormark Securities, 2011, 
http://www.slideshare.net/RareEarthsRareMetals/cormark-securities-rare-earth-metals-initiating-
coverage 
 
Rare earths are vital for green technologies apart from magnets. Most important are 
phosphors, used for low-emission lighting and in the efficient thin-film semi-
conductors for solar panels. Although some demand for lanthanum also comes from 
producers of nickel metal hydride batteries (again used in the Prius) it is expected 
that electric vehicle manufactures will soon switch to more efficient lithium-ion 
batteries that do not depend on REE. Designs for hydrogen fuel cells, which may 
well replace these batteries in the long run, tend to include significant quantities of 
rare earths, although the large-scale adoption of this technology remains some way 
off, given the technical and infrastructural difficulties involved. 
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Demand for REEs across the board is projected to grow by an annual average of 8–
11% (see Table 3 and Figure 2), but sectors driven by growth in green technology 
show greatest potential for market expansion.9 This has led the US Department of 
Energy (DoE) to list five rare earths as ‘critical’, defined as their importance for 
clean energy (which can be regarded as a proxy for growth in demand) set against 
risk to supply.10 In descending order of criticality,  
Figure 2: Total global REO supply and demand projections 2011 -2017 
(tonnes) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: IMCOA, TMR Critical Metals Report, author’s own calculations 
Scenario A: Slower expansion of ROW sources and Chinese supply constant at 
2010 level 
Scenario B: Slower expansion of ROW sources and annual 3% growth in Chinese 
supply 
Scenario C: Faster expansion of ROW sources and Chinese supply constant at 
2010 level 
Scenario D: Faster expansion of ROW sources and annual 3% growth in Chinese 
supply 
Scenario E: Slower expansion of ROW sources and Chinese supply limited to 2011 
production quota 
Scenario F: Faster expansion of ROW sources and Chinese supply limited to 2011 
production quota 
NB: ROW =‘Rest of the World’ 
Source: Hatch GP, Critical Rare Earths: Global Supply and Demand Projections and the 
Leading Contenders for New Sources of Supply. Carpentersville, Illinois: Technology Metals 
Research, LLC, 2011; author’s own calculations 
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Figure 3: Total critical rare earths supply and demand projections 2011–
2017(tonnes) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical REOs: dysprosium, yttrium, terbium, europium, neodymium 
 
Figures 2 and 3 above show potential supply and demand for global REOs (after 
separation) for the next six years. They show that the issue of supply and demand 
is very different when critical rare earths are considered separately from REEs as 
a whole. For all scenarios, global supply is likely to be in surplus for both 
categories by 2017. The transition point to surplus, however, depends on the 
extent to which China is willing and able to continue efforts to consolidate its 
domestic industry and limit production; as well as the speed at which ROW 
producers are able to bring new mines into production. For total rare earths, 
global supply may exceed demand as early as 2012 (possibly 2017, although most 
projections show a global surplus by 2015 at the latest). According to current 
forecasts the transition date for critical rare earths should come between 2014 
and 2017, although the supply of some individual REEs may remain critical 
beyond these dates. All these projections have major implications in terms of the 
leverage China will hold in attempting to induce foreign downstream producers 
to relocate production to China. Supply deficits and surpluses will also affect the 
commercial viability of many new mines currently in development. They will also 
be affected by the need to identify substitutes for rare earths, which in turn may 
result in sufficient demand reduction radically to alter these forecasts.  
 
Sources: Hatch GP, Critical Rare Earths: Global Supply and Demand Projections and the 
Leading Contenders for New Sources of Supply. Carpentersville, Illinois: Technology Metals 
Research, LLC, 2011; author’s own calculations 
Much of the criticality in supply of individual REEs is determined by the physical 
nature of global REE deposits. Crucial to that, in turn, is the realisation that given its 
17 distinct elements, the rare earth industry behaves very differently from that for 
other metals. For example, cerium is likely to be produced in large surplus within 
two years, despite its being the most widely used of the rare earths. It will therefore 
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become largely unresponsive to demand, with concomitant depressed prices, 
because as noted earlier it tends to be present in almost all REE-containing deposits 
(which for technical reasons cannot be mined for individual elements). Exploitation 
of a mine to extract a far scarcer REE such as dysprosium is therefore likely also to 
produce much greater amounts of cerium and of other relatively abundant rare 
earths, such as lanthanum and neodymium, whether or not there is a commercial 
reason for so doing. When consideration of this is added to an understanding of 
likely demand, the key driver of which is green applications, the relevant and 
relatively complex nexus between supply and demand for each individual metal 
starts to become clear. This is why, for example, neodymium, the third most 
common rare earth, is included in the DoE critical list, although cerium is not.  It is 
because large quantities of neodymium are required for the permanent magnets 
mentioned above. 
Given this complexity it is not hard to see why commentary on the rare earth sector 
at times seems shrouded in confusion and over-simplification. In many cases all 
REEs are grouped together as though they were a single commodity, such as copper 
or gold. Occasionally there is even confusion between the terms ‘rare earths’ and 
‘critical metals’,11  as there was in a recent video produced by The Guardian that 
incorrectly identified coltan and cassiterite in the Democratic Republic of Congo as 
being ‘rare earth minerals’. Certainly, many REEs may be considered critical in the 
broad sense that they are strategically important materials with possible supply 
bottlenecks. Grouping together such metals, and including with them among others 
antimony, mercury, tungsten and the platinum group, might make sense for further 
study, whether for comparison purposes or for considering entire supply chains for 
economically or strategically important manufactures.12  Several REEs, however, do 
not meet the criteria for criticality in terms of economic importance or supply risk.  
A further problem arises from some investment advice, which in the absence of 
much academic writing is perhaps the major source of information on the rare earth 
industry, other than mainstream media reporting. Again, there is a tendency to 
consider REEs in the aggregate rather than individually, which makes for poor 
advice in identifying which rare earth mining ventures are likely to succeed.13  When 
differentiation is attempted it often takes the form of highlighting differences 
between ‘light’ (LREE) and ‘heavy’ (HREE) rare earths.14  There is some logic to 
this insofar as HREEs tend to be found in much smaller quantities and HREE 
deposits usually also contain large quantities of LREEs, while the converse does not 
hold. This approach, however, overlooks projected demand, which is what makes 
neodymium and sometimes praseodymium appear on lists of critical REEs. 
 
THE RARE EARTHS SECTOR 
EVOLUTION TOWARDS THE CURRENT DOMINANCE OF 
CHINA 
It is perhaps surprising to learn that rare earths, which until recently remained 
relatively obscure, have been mined commercially since the 1880s.  Initially the 
industry was concentrated in Norway and Sweden15, producing first for the new 
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incandescent lamp mantle industry and later for a very small number of other 
applications, such as lighter flints. Brazil, India and the US joined as producers over 
the next three decades, extracting REEs from monazite-placer deposits, though a 
host of technical difficulties stemming from rare earths’ mysterious and complex 
chemical properties limited their commercial exploitation. Indeed, the last REE 
metal, promethium, was first produced as recently as 1931.  
Major advances in separation processing occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
They brought down the costs and difficulties associated with REE production and 
stimulated research into potential end uses for the metals. Until markets for the new 
applications were fully established, however, the most commercially viable means of 
producing rare earths was as a by-product of the radioactive element thorium, found 
in REE-containing monazite and bastnaesite deposits. Indeed, it was waste from the 
extraction of bastnaesite at Steenkampskraal in the Western Cape that made South 
Africa the world leader in REE production during the 1950s. Most of the 
applications for rare earths now regarded as important had not been identified by 
then, so many of the 17 elements had little more than curiosity value.  
The Steenkampskraal mine produced REOs to be used mainly in the optics industry 
as polishing media, or for colouring glass. The commercial fortunes of the mine, 
however, were determined exclusively by the thorium market. During initial 
development of the post-Second World War nuclear power industry thorium, less 
hazardous and more abundant than uranium, was regarded as having great potential 
as a fuel source. Steenkampskraal became the United Kingdom’s major source of 
thorium for this use in the 1950s, though production ceased in the early 1960s when 
uranium (which unlike thorium is suitable for dual civilian and military use), began to 
be favoured. With this, rare earth production at the site also ended, leaving an 
abandoned mine and tailings containing both rare earths and thorium. 
In the mid-1960s a new phase in the history of rare earths began as a new major 
application was discovered, for europium as the source of red luminescence in 
colour television sets. This made rare earth production in itself a potentially 
profitable business, provided it was conducted on a large enough scale.  That up-
scaling came with the operation that started in 1965 at the huge Mountain Pass 
mine16, dwarfing the previous output of the relatively small Steenkampskraal facility.  
 
THE RISE OF CHINA’S RARE EARTHS SECTOR 
A steady stream of new applications for rare earths continued through the 1970s, 
crucially including their first use in high-strength permanent magnets. This 
expanding market caught the attention of Chinese officialdom, aware that in the 
1980s China possessed the majority of known global reserves of REEs. A 
programme of state support for innovation in extraction and processing, combined 
with low labour costs and a lack of attention to environmental standards, allowed 
China’s rare earth mining industry to grow at an annual average of 40% throughout 
the 1980s.17 Clearly, the strategic potential of the sector was recognised early: Deng 
Xiaoping compared China’s REE reserves with Middle Eastern oil in a speech in 
1992.18   
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Chinese REE extraction was (and still is) concentrated in two areas. The first is 
around the huge Bayan Obo iron-niobium-rare earth deposits in Inner Mongolia, the 
source of about half of China’s rare earths and therefore almost half of global REE 
extraction. Beyond this are ionic clay deposits in Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Hunan, Jiangxi, Shandong, Yunnan and, especially, Sichuan. Though China’s output 
has risen from a 27% share of rare earth ore production in 1990 to today’s 97%, 
growth has not always gone hand in hand with profitability. Mindful of this, 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s Beijing sought to limit the exploitation of rare 
earths through production quotas imposed on individual provinces. The provinces’ 
reliance on rare earths as a source of revenue and employment, however, led in 
many cases to much higher rates of production. Often this has taken the form of 
illegal and artisanal mining, using basic technology – in some cases simply pumping 
acids into the ground – which has proved environmentally devastating, particularly 
in Guangdong, Jiangxi and Sichuan.19   
Since 1990 rare earths have been an officially protected and strategic sector in China. 
This status has brought with it a complete ban on foreign investment in mining and 
its restriction to joint-venture projects with Chinese firms at the separation stage. A 
further restriction has been in the form of export quotas. Since little existed by way 
of a Chinese REE industry at midstream or downstream levels until the 2000s, these 
quotas were relatively relaxed. They became less so after an attempt, beginning in 
earnest in 2006, to encourage the nascent domestic industry by gradually restricting 
exports of oxides in an effort to capitalise on what had become almost total 
upstream dominance. 
These export quota restrictions generated real media interest only since about 2009, 
when global demand began to approach the limits of Chinese supply. A 40% cut in 
Chinese exports announced in 2010 piqued Western interest and brought home the 
vulnerability of rare earth supply lines, in turn creating the conditions for the current 
scramble to identify and develop new non-Chinese mines. Despite expectations that 
2011 export levels would be set much lower, however, they remained more or less 
unchanged from the previous year.20  Nevertheless some rare earth alloys were 
included on the list of restricted products from 2011, which means that in practice 
quotas are rather tighter than before. Indeed, it is thought that this situation 
prompted the decision of the Japanese rare earth manufacturer Showa Denko to 
relocate about 20% of its production to China.21 The company had been relying on 
imports of newly-restricted REE-containing ferro-alloys for some of its Japanese 
operations. 
Official export quotas, however, tell only part of the story of China’s rare earths 
strategy. Perhaps more significant is its effort to crack down on illegal mining and 
smuggling, which in the past may have represented 20% of total rare earth exports.22  
This move is coupled with a renewed drive to reduce and strictly enforce overall 
production quotas. Legal production of REOs in China in 2010 amounted to 
perhaps 130 000 tonnes, despite an official quota of 89 200 tonnes.23 Scepticism that 
the 2011 target of 93 200 tonnes would not be greatly exceeded seemed justified 
until a wave of shut-downs, beginning in August, brought the majority of REE firms 
offline amid reports that the quota had already been reached. This situation initially 
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encompassed a large number of small producers, but has since grown to include 
three of the eight major firms in Ganzhou, a prefecture responsible for some 40% of 
Chinese REE output. At the time of writing China and the world’s largest REE 
producer, Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-Tech Co, has announced a month-long 
suspension of all activities24 with the explicit aim of boosting prices in the face of the 
current economic recession. In September The New York Times reported that  
‘...most of the country’s rare earth factories have been closed since early 
August, including those under government control, to allow for 
installation of pollution control equipment that must be in place by Oct. 
1 (sic)’.25 
There appears to have been no official announcement of such a move, however.26  
The latest development regarding Chinese government efforts to control the sector 
has been the announcement of its intention to institute a formal system of invoices 
for REE purchases, in the hope that this will stop the trade in illicitly mined rare 
earths. This led to a short-term price crash in early November 2011, as suppliers 
which would find themselves outside the new system attempted to dump their 
inventory before it was too late.27 Some prices fell by as much as two-thirds in a 
matter of days. This temporary flood of rare earths on to the market may assist 
downstream producers by allowing them to stockpile some material as a buffer 
against future government-mandated supply restrictions. Since these are mainly 
illegally mined rare earths, however, it remains unclear how much of this material 
has been available for the black market in exports, and therefore how far foreign 
customers have also been able to build up their inventories in the same way. That 
said, the fact that the announcement of the new restrictions prompted a rush to 
dump REEs indicates an expectation that the rules will be enforced. This in turn 
suggests that in the long run China may indeed produce REEs only up to the 
volume of its official production quotas – a prospect that until now, few analysts 
have regarded as likely. 
Of course, against the background of a still relatively unprofitable, over-producing 
and polluting industry rapidly depleting a strategic resource that will probably 
become even more important in future, Chinese attempts to limit production and 
exports do not necessarily merit the sinister spin placed upon them by much 
Western analysis.28  Two major strands of Western fears over rare earths have been 
first, the US realisation of the vulnerability of some of its key defence supply lines 
and secondly, a concern that China may begin to use the strategic importance of rare 
earths as a geo-political bargaining chip. US military equipment tends to be more 
technologically advanced than that of most other forces and therefore incorporates 
more REE inputs. This also applies to the US production of arms for export to 
allies.29 Any squeeze on REE supply lines would affect a wide range of cutting-edge 
military hardware, including among many others the Predator drone, the M1 Abrams 
main battle tank and the Tomahawk cruise missile. 
Fears for the dependence of the US on supply chains from what influential circles in 
the US view as a future geo-strategic competitor were heightened by the fallout from 
a September 2010 incident in which a Chinese trawler captain was arrested by 
Japanese coastguards. The incident took place in waters off the Senkaku Islands 
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(called Diaoyu by China), claimed by both Japan and China. Subsequently it was 
widely reported that China had placed an unofficial embargo on exports of REEs to 
Japan.30   
It remains unclear, however, whether this was the case. The story appears to have 
originated when the Japanese trade, industry and economy minister relayed 
anecdotal evidence that some Chinese trading firms had ceased exports to Japan.31  
That this conjecture was picked up as fact by The New York Times, added to the 
same newspaper’s interpretation that the existing tightening of export quotas 
worldwide represented a possible widening of the embargo to the US and European 
Union, suggests that the earlier Japanese story may have also been simply an over-
reaction to reduced exports arising from lower quotas. Seen from the Western 
standpoint this was an apparent sign of Beijing’s ability and intent to use its control 
of REE supply chains in pursuit of geo-political goals. Whatever the reality, China is 
certainly attempting to leverage its upstream monopoly in its own interest through a 
programme of export restrictions, lower domestic production quotas, crackdowns 
on illegal mining and consolidation of the industry into a more manageable number 
of firms.  
Many competing reasons have been posited as to the precise goals of such moves. 
Officially, efforts to eliminate illegal mining are driven by a desire to secure a scarce 
resource in the face of rising domestic demand, and to lessen the environmental 
impact of a notoriously pollutant industry which has laid waste to large tracts of 
Inner Mongolia and Southern provinces.32  Environmentalism is also cited as the 
rationale for consolidation of the industry, with smaller firms being folded into 
larger enterprises should they fail a series of environmental checks (which Western 
observers tend to assume will be spurious).33  Furthermore, protection of the 
environment provides a probable defence in the likely event that a case is brought 
against China at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) over export restrictions on 
REEs. In 2009 the US, EU and Mexico lodged a formal complaint regarding 
Chinese export controls on magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, fluorspar, silicon 
carbide and yellow phosphorus, with the WTO finding in July 2011 that such 
restrictions indeed broke global trade rules.34   
The ruling was keenly anticipated within the rare earths sector, where it was regarded 
as a test case that could be applied equally to Chinese REEs. As expected, China is 
appealing against the ruling, a process which may take several years to work its way 
through the courts. Any analogous complaint with reference to rare earths would be 
similarly drawn out, which means that China has considerable breathing space to 
pursue its current rare earths strategy without needing to worry too much about 
possible sanctions. In any event China may now have a better chance with a defence 
of its REE policies, since it argues that WTO rules allow it to restrict production on 
environmental grounds. Given recent moves to slow production for export and 
domestic markets alike, China is also less vulnerable now to charges that it is unfairly 
discriminating against exporters. 
The question remains as to what drives this policy. As explanations for Chinese 
moves in the REE sector, environmental concerns appear at least plausible and 
conservation of resources for domestic use, unarguable. Over-production may have 
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lowered prices to the point of forcing international competition out of business, but 
it also brought with it decades of exporting large quantities of a strategic mineral at 
low, and often even unprofitable, prices.  
Outside China, however, there is considerable scepticism as to whether this 
represents the full story. Governmental and buyer firms’ concerns revolve around 
the effect of export restrictions, and greater legal enforcement of them, in effectively 
instituting a twin-track pricing system for rare earths with a ‘rest of world’ (ROW) 
price far higher than Chinese domestic prices.35  Under these circumstances it hardly 
seems unreasonable to see Chinese moves as designed to leverage downstream 
dominance into the expansion of upstream industry within China, either through the 
development of indigenous firms or by inducing foreign producers to relocate 
production to China.36 This is indeed starting, with several Japanese companies 
planning to relocate some operations. Among them is Hitachi Metals, the world’s 
largest rare earth magnet manufacturer, which plans to move up to 20% of its 
magnet production to China. From a Chinese perspective the potential for 
technology transfer is a key issue in such deals, with a former vice president of the 
China Non-Ferrous Metals Engineering and Design Institute noting that China’s 
stance on rare earths is part of long-standing attempts to trade access to resources 
for access to technology. This policy was first discussed in the landmark State High-
Tech Development Plan (863 Programme) released in 1986.37   
Today, around 60% of global REE magnet finished components production takes 
place in China, effectively representing the completion in 2002 of the holus-bolus 
transfer of the formerly dominant US rare earth magnet industry. Importantly, 
China’s REE magnet industry is twice the size of the next largest, that of Japan.38  
Patents for the most widely used class of REE magnet, neodymium-iron-boron 
magnets (NdFeB), were split in the 1980s, after much wrangling, between Hitachi 
Metals and General Motors’ magnets division, Magnequench Inc. This set up dual 
dominance of the NdFeB magnet manufacturing industry between Japan and the 
US, until in 1995 Magnequench was sold to a consortium of San Huan New 
Materials High Tech Inc. and China Nonferrous Metals Import and Export 
Company, backed by a US investment company.  
Surprisingly, perhaps, that the deal was not blocked by US lawmakers. Of course, 
REE magnets had far fewer applications in the mid-1990s than they have today, 
although the early 1990s incorporation of NdFeB magnets in Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDam) ‘smart’ bombs would surely have made such technology sensitive 
even then. The deal was not waved through unconditionally, however; it included a 
stipulation that the new owners did not remove production or any jobs from the 
company’s Indiana location for at least five years. It now appears that this period 
was used to experiment with the duplication of the entire magnet production line in 
China. This proved satisfactory and on the very day of the expiry of the agreement 
in 2002 the Indiana plant was closed and all its machinery shipped to China.39  This 
date coincided with the closure of the Mountain Pass mine, meaning that almost at 
one stroke the entire US rare earth magnet supply chain ceased to exist.40   
The Chinese REE sector has faced greater difficulties in its attempts to appropriate 
to itself the technology of Japan’s REE magnet industry. Largely through the 
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acquisition of Magnequench and the removal of US competition, the Chinese 
magnet industry was able to grow by an annual average of 30% between 1996 and 
2006, a pace that approached the astonishing expansion of the downstream REE 
industry in China over the 1980s.41  The original terms of the agreement between 
Magnequench and Hitachi on patents, however, meant that there was less scope to 
completely out-compete international rivals – in this case largely based in Japan – as 
had effectively been the case in extraction, separation and refining.  
That was because the industry had been split more or less in half. Magnequench 
acquired patents for a production process known as ‘melt spinning’, and Hitachi 
took those associated with the rather different technique of ‘sintering’. These two 
methods produce magnets with somewhat distinct properties suit them, with some 
overlap, for different end uses. The two firms have also taken contrasting routes in 
exploiting their technology. Magnequench (now Neo Materials Technology) sells 
melt-spun NdFeB powder to magnet manufacturers, mainly in China but also to 
Europe. Hitachi, on the other hand, produces its own sintered magnets, as well as 
providing licences to a limited number of other companies to do so. Where possible 
the Japanese government has attempted to protect its REE magnet industry by 
requiring that any Japanese manufacturer producing devices containing magnets 
covered by Hitachi’s patents, must obtain such magnets from Japanese sources. 
This approach has had some success in limiting the penetration of Chinese 
component manufacturers into the Japanese market. More important, until now it 
has also blocked the possibility of technology transfer to China of sintered NdFeB 
magnet manufacture. With current supply difficulties engendered by Chinese moves 
to limit the production and export of REOs, the economic calculus for Hitachi-
licensed Japanese magnet manufacturers has changed significantly.  
It is no surprise, given the far better prices available within China for REE, that 
Hitachi has recently announced plans to move 20% of its production to China, 
which will involve a joint venture with Chinese firms.42  Although a diminishing 
resource base and environmental degradation are undoubtedly concerns for China, 
the opportunities for technology transfer which these developments bring with them 
appear the likely motivation behind Beijing’s current moves in the rare earth sector, 
when viewed in the context of a long-standing policy of strategic expansion at all 
points of the supply chain.  
 
GLOBAL REACTION TO CHINESE 
MONOPOLY 
Growing worldwide realisation of the implications of China’s REE monopoly, 
brought into sharp focus by the glut of governmental reports and mainstream media 
coverage of current supply issues, and combined with price surges for REEs, has 
provoked contrasting reactions. Attempts to counteract China’s power over the 
industry can be divided into two forms: projects aimed at reducing reliance on rare 
earths, and efforts to reinvigorate non-Chinese supply chains.  
Japan is currently the most active in attempts to reduce reliance on rare earths, 
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pursuing technological avenues to reduce its need for REE imports from China. 
This programme involves a $1.3 billion package of spending on projects in pursuit 
of its stated aim of a one-third reduction in demand for rare earth inputs into 
Japanese industry.43 This may take the form of more efficient use of REEs, attempts 
to recycle rare earths from old electronic equipment, or more ambitious efforts to 
substitute REE components with other materials. Some progress has been made on 
all fronts with, for example, Hitachi and Toyota developing ferric oxide-based 
motors which may in future match the performance of NdFeB units. Getting all 
these projects to the point where they become widely adopted, however, may take a 
long time. In its efforts to speed the process Japan has announced that it will co-
operate with the US and EU on these matters.44  
As part of the global response to Chinese-induced supply constraints, however, 
Japan is also active in the attempt to locate and develop non-Chinese rare earth 
deposits. Tokyo has reached agreements for exploration rights in Lai Chau province 
in Vietnam. In a signal that the Japanese government is thinking long-term, $287 
million has also been invested in developing a fleet of underwater vessels to identify 
REE resources on the ocean floor in waters off Japan.45 Most global attention, 
however, has focused on the efforts of Western companies to exploit more 
conventional sources of rare earths worldwide. 
 
BEYOND CHINA: THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR RARE EARTHS 
Surges in rare earth spot prices driven by worries over supplies from China have led 
to great interest on the part of investors in a ROW rare earth industry that had been 
all but moribund from 2002 to 2009. This interest in turn has resulted in a new wave 
of junior mining companies, largely Canadian or Australian, scouring the globe for 
potential rare earth projects. Many of these are newly-identified deposits, although in 
other cases firms have bought previously producing mines forced out of business by 
Chinese competition. A picture is emerging of a scramble between juniors at various 
stages of exploration, permit acquisition and construction of mines, in an effort to 
fill the gap in supply left by China’s choking off exports as demand continues to rise.  
Scarcely a week goes by without an announcement of new drilling for rare earth 
deposits across the globe. Thus far, none of these projects has reached production. 
The most advanced appear to be the Lynas Corporation’s Mount Weld development 
in Western Australia and Colorado-based Molycorp Inc’s attempt to restart the 
Mountain Pass mine. Both these projects are likely to come online in 2012.  
Deposits, however, are geographically widespread, with potential sources of REEs 
identified in several other locations in North America and Australia, as well as 
Southern and East Africa, Russia, Central Asia, Vietnam and Brazil (see Table 4). 
Since rare earths are not tradable commodities, investor interest has been 
concentrated on opportunities in junior miners’ stocks.46 This has added to fevered 
speculation fuelled by what often appears a simplistic grasp of industry issues that 
does not take into account the different conditions of supply and demand for each 
of the rare earth elements. Most experts seem to agree that the majority of the new 
projects will never become working mines, though of course for many investors in 
juniors this was of limited concern, provided that excitement around the REE sector 
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led to higher stock prices before they sold on.47  
This phase, now referred to as a mini-bubble,48 appears to have passed. Rare earth 
miners’ share prices have tumbled across the board. In recent months this has been 
accentuated by the global economic downturn, which has prompted widespread 
disinvestment from equities across all industries in favour of safer havens. That said, 
it remains clear from demand projections that a significant market for non-Chinese 
rare earths will remain, and indeed grow in coming years. Revealingly, prices for rare 
earths themselves are holding up in the face of economic recession. Based on 
industry predictions there appears to be space for around five to 10 new non-
Chinese rare earth producers. Barriers to entry are high, notwithstanding the 
unpredictable quality of deposits before drilling, and the difficulties involved in 
assessing returns given the different supply and demand conditions that apply to 
each individual metal. New mines require very large capital investments and long 
development times. Environmental concerns bring further costs and delays, 
particularly because most mining operations also produce large quantities of 
radioactive material, mostly thorium.49   
Clearly, an important aspect of the potential for a venture to become a working mine 
is the quality of the deposit. As discussed earlier, supply and demand projections for 
different REEs mean that prospective revenue from any particular mine partly 
depends upon the mix of elements contained within each deposit. Those with high 
concentrations of critical rare earths50 as a percentage of total recoverable ores are 
regarded as the most attractive. A further complication arises, however, in that 
deposits also vary in terms of overall material grade, defined in terms of the 
proportion of total rare earths within a deposit, expressed as kilograms of total rare 
earths per tonne. While some deposits may contain large quantities of critical REEs, 
 
Table 5:  Selected advanced rare earth projects outside China and Africa 
Project Company Location Total REO  
(tonnes) 
Projected 
production 
start date 
Mountain 
Pass 
Molycorp US 2 072 037 2012–2013 
Bokan Ucore Rare Metals US (Alaska)     27 321 Unknown 
Hoidas 
Lake 
Great Western 
Minerals Group  
Canada     68 395 Unknown 
Thor Lake Avalon Rare Metals Canada 4 297 807 2015–2016 
Strange 
Lake 
Quest Rare Minerals Canada 2 098 248 2016 
Montviel Geomega Resources Canada 3 645 887 2012–2013 
Dubbo Alkane Resources Australia    651 480 2012–2013 
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Nolan’s 
Bore 
Arafura Resources Australia    848 000 2014 
Mount 
Weld 
Lynas  Australia 1 413 646 2012 
Kvanefjeld Greenland Minerals 
and Energy 
Greenland 6 328 700 2016 
Kutessay 
II 
Stans Energy Kyrgyzstan     46 608 Unknown 
Nora Karr Tasman Metals Sweden   326 700 Unknown 
Salobo Vale SA Brazil Unknown Unknown 
Source: Compiled by Author 
they may have a low material grade; hence a larger tonnage of ore must be mined 
and processed to produce a given quantity of oxide. This significantly increases 
production costs. Ordinarily, there is a trade-off between these two metrics, with 
high material grade deposits tending to contain smaller quantities of critical rare 
earths as a percentage of the total. Investors therefore face a complicated calculus as 
to which REE projects are likely to be most profitable. With none of these new 
ROW mines yet operating, production costs at this stage remain estimates, usually 
only known to the companies concerned.51 While, therefore, it is possible to make 
useful comparisons between the commercial prospects of individual mines, such 
judgements necessarily contain a certain amount of guesswork. 
Along with the over-simplification of REEs into one commodity found in much 
mainstream and business media coverage of the industry, goes a further common 
error. This is an overwhelming concentration, often to the exclusion of the rest of 
the supply chain, on the potential gap in the supply of raw materials created by 
China’s recent rare earths strategy. It remains arguable as to whether new mining 
firms may be able to make a profit selling at the oxide stage, after separation.52 Some 
expert opinion suggests that oxides and alloys must be included on a combined 
balance sheet if they are to be commercially viable. Certainly it appears that some 
form of vertical integration beyond separation is necessary. There is the further 
complication that different end users of rare earths require oxides of specific 
purities. Put simplistically, this means that the junior miners with the best chance of 
surviving in a crowded sector are those with at least some idea of their customers’ 
requirements. This realisation has given rise to two business models for potential 
future success..  
The less common of these is a fully integrated supply chain, such as the ‘mine to 
market’ strategy of Canada’s Great Western Minerals Group Ltd (GWMG). This 
company already owns two of the few rare earth processing facilities outside China. 
(One is in the UK and another in the US and both are capable of producing REE 
alloys and powders.) Through mining ventures in Canada and South Africa it aims to 
end dependence on Chinese raw material, thereby establishing the first complete 
REE supply chain outside China since 2002.53   
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The second approach is to guarantee a customer base by signing off-take agreements 
with a partner higher up in the supply chain. For instance, in July 2011 the 
Luxembourg-based junior mining company Frontier Rare Earths Ltd entered into 
such an agreement with the Korean parastatal Korea Resources Corporation (Kores) 
under which the latter would acquire a 10% stake in Frontier and a 20% share in its 
Zandkopsdrift mine in Namaqualand, South Africa, with the expectation of buying 
40% of the REOs eventually produced there.54   
Important for both strategies is the technical expertise brought by established 
players in the REE industry, which after a decade-long gap in significant production 
is in short supply outside East Asia. Those junior miners that currently lack a 
prospective supply chain extending beyond the ore and oxide stages seem destined 
either to disappear or to be bought out by other firms, unless they are also able to 
secure a suitable customer base.55   
 
SOUTH AFRICA’S RE-EMERGING RARE 
EARTHS INDUSTRY 
South Africa is one of the more promising possible locations for a reinvigorated 
REE industry. Several sites have been identified. In September 2011 a new junior 
miner, Galileo Resources Plc, acquired the Glenover open pit phosphate mine in 
Limpopo Province. This had been abandoned in 1984, but tests have shown that 
tailings left at the site contain significant quantities of rare earths.56 Most attention, 
however, has centred on two projects often discussed as among the most promising 
of the new wave of ROW developments. These are respectively Steenkampskraal57 
and Zandkopsdrift. 
Table 6: Advanced South African rare earth projects  
(Compared with Mountain Pass) 
Project Steenkampskraal Zandkopsdrift Mountain Pass 
Company 
GWMG/ 
Ganzhou 
Qiandong Rare 
Earth 
Frontier Rare 
Earths/ 
Kores 
Molycorp 
Location Western Cape Northern Cape California 
Estimated 
Production Start 
Date 
2013 2015-2016 2012-2013 
Total Mineral 
Resource (tonnes) 
249 500 43 730 000 31 552 000 
Total REO (tonnes) 29 400 945 863 2 072 037 
Critical REOs (kg 
per (tonnes) of 
26.2 4.6 8.1 
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mineral resource 
Critical REOs as % 
of total REOS to 
be extracted 
22.5 21.4 12.3 
Projected life of 
mine 
6-10 years 48 years 104 years 
Projected Total 
Annual REO 
Production 
(tonnes) 
5014 20 000 20 000 
Projected Annual 
CREO production 
(tonnes) 
1128 4280 2460 
Critical REOs: dysprosium, yttrium, terbium, europium, neodymium 
Source: Hatch GP, Critical Rare Earths: Global Supply and Demand Projections and the 
Leading Contenders for New Sources of Supply. Carpentersville, Illinois: Technology Metals 
Research, LLC, 2011 
 
STEENKAMPSKRAAL 
Steenkampskraal is a formerly producing monazite mine that was worked, with some 
interruptions, from 1950 to 1963. During that time it operated primarily as a thorium 
mine, exporting the radioactive material as a nuclear fuel source to the UK. Rare 
earths, with their then limited range of end uses, were mined as little more than a by-
product, though this in itself was sufficient to make South Africa an early leader in 
REE output. Eventually, nuclear technology switched to uranium and in 
consequence the Steenkampskraal mine was abandoned.  
As the number of applications for rare earths grew, two attempts were made to 
restart mining at the site. The first of these, in 1997, was deemed unviable given the 
depressed prices of REEs at that time. The second, beginning around 2005, ran into 
pricing problems in the 2008 global recession.58  At this point GWMG bought a 
controlling interest in the project, soon after its acquisition of the UK-based REE 
powder and alloy manufacturer Less Common Metals Ltd.  
Steenkampskraal seemed to offer considerable advantages over GWMG’s rare earth 
extractive projects in North America, not least because as a formerly producing mine 
it might be expected to require a far shorter restart development time. Though there 
seem to have been considerable delays in re-commissioning, the fact that GWMG 
bought a rare earth deposit with the aim of providing for its own manufacturing 
plant, before the new scramble for rare earths began, gives the company a head start 
over many rivals. If production begins on schedule in the last quarter of 2012, 
Steenkampskraal may well be the first of the new ROW rare earth mines to become 
operational. 
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Steenkampskraal’s status as a former thorium mine creates both advantages and 
potential problems. From a commercial standpoint the costs of refurbishing and 
reopening the mine are significantly lower than for comparable projects. Inclusive of 
the construction of a nearby separation plant, costs are expected to run to $60 
million, against an estimated $600 million for Zandkopsdrift (see below).59 Part of 
the attraction of the Steenkampskraal site is that a large number of rare earths are 
contained in tailings from previous operations, left above ground. These come from 
an era when the only REEs of commercial interest were those with applications in 
the optical industry, far less important today. There is therefore a much greater 
concentration of more valuable REEs left in the tailings on site, which compared 
with other mines gives Steenkampskraal an unrivalled rating in terms of the 
percentage of critical REEs available for extraction. A further benefit for GWMG is 
the South African government’s waiver of royalty payments, which normally would 
be 5–7% of gross revenue, in exchange for a commitment to clean up the waste left 
at the site from previous operations.  
This work would no doubt have been necessary in any case, so it is difficult to see 
the benefit of this aspect of the deal to the local community or to South Africa as a 
whole. One industry source alleged in an interview that royalties were in fact waived 
in exchange for especially beneficial terms under Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) legislation. Under this arrangement a mandatory 26% black ownership of the 
mine will translate into 26% of revenues from mined – as opposed to separated – 
product accruing to the BEE trust, without requiring any capital in return.60 The 
source further maintains that the 26% revenue is roughly equivalent to the 7% 
royalty on mining and a 5% payment on processes products that the government has 
waived. If true, this effectively represents a transfer of tax revenues to BEE groups. 
This situation contrasts with that at Zandkopsdrift, where BEE groups receive a free 
carry-through on their interest in the mine only until the completion of a full 
feasibility study, at which point they will be required to pay market value for their 
stake.61  
Problems may arise with high levels of thorium present in the Steenkampskraal 
deposit. An environmental assessment report for the mine is in the process of being 
prepared, after which South Africa’s National Nuclear Regulator will produce 
detailed guidelines for all activities at the site. (Concern over radiation at the mine is 
such that employees currently are required to wear protective clothing and carry 
dosimeters.) Steenkampskraal is an underground (as opposed to open pit) mine, 
which should limit the release of thorium as dust when mining operations restart, 
although at present little is known of the effect of radioactive waste that has now 
lain above ground for almost five decades. The mine is already an approved site for 
the storage of thorium; GWMG plans to reduce potential hazards by mixing the 
thorium with concrete and storing it in blocks underground. This is partly in the 
hope that at some point in the future thorium may again become a sought-after 
material as a fuel source and possibly also for use in desalination plants.62   
The idea of exploiting the nation’s thorium reserves is not new, given South Africa’s 
well-documented energy generation problems, its reliance on polluting coal power 
plants and its status as the least energy-efficient nation in Africa. Thorium is a 
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potential alternative to uranium as a nuclear fuel. Indeed it is preferable in many 
ways due to its more efficient power-generating capacity and shorter half-life.63  It is 
also inherently incapable of triggering a meltdown, which makes it an even more 
attractive proposition in the wake of the March 2011 Fukushima incident in Japan. A 
government-funded subsidiary of South Africa’s electricity utility Eskom, however, 
spent 10 years and ZAR 15 billion64 in an unsuccessful attempt to produce a 
working pebble bed modular reactor using thorium, before the project was cancelled 
in 2010. Nevertheless, other reactor designs are feasible and, subject to licensing, 
thorium remains a possible fuel source for planned South African nuclear plants. 
There is also reported interest from Saudi Arabia, China, the US, UK and South 
Korea.65  
Compared with other REE mines likely to become operational in the near future 
Steenkampskraal is relatively small, with a probable annual output of around 5 000 
tonnes of rare earth oxides at full capacity. This is the equivalent of the estimated 
shortfall created by the production halt announced by Baotou. The Steenkampskraal 
deposit, however, is thought to contain 26.2 kilograms per tonne (kg/t) of critical 
rare earths, which would give it the highest material grade of any new REE project 
currently in development – another factor in lowering production costs.  (By 
comparison the next highest, Mount Weld in Australia, has 16.6kg/t of critical rare 
earths.66) GWMG’s mine-to-market strategy is also noteworthy in that it is the first 
attempt to construct a fully-integrated complete supply chain outside China. The 
involvement of significant foreign partners also bodes well. Aichi Steel Corporation, 
part of the Toyota group, which is already a customer for alloys produced by 
GWMG at its UK manufacturing plant, signed an agreement in April 2011 to 
continue this arrangement with alloys formed from REOs sourced from 
Steenskampskraal.67   
Perhaps more significant from both commercial and political-economic points of 
view is the heads of terms agreement reached with the Ganzhou Qiandong Rare 
Earth (GQRE) group of Jiangxi, China. The agreement provides for the formation 
of a joint venture with GWMG to build a separation plant close to the mine, with 
GQRE taking a 25% share in the new company. Although the details are still 
somewhat hazy, it appears that the facility will be able to process more than the 
probable output of Steenkampskraal. This opens several possibilities. GWMG is 
conducting further exploration in the area and may be hoping to build enough 
capacity to handle future sources of REE oxides from the same area. The company 
may also have designs on processing oxides extracted by the Canadian-based 
Namibia Rare Earths Inc at its Lofdal project across the Namibian border; or even 
material from sites further afield in Africa that lack the infrastructure to sustain 
separation facilities. The latter seems the more likely, taking into account that the life 
of the Steenkampskraal mine is unlikely to be longer than 10 years.  
The deal is also important from a Chinese perspective as it represents the first such 
involvement of a Chinese rare earths company with a Western rare earths producer. 
Steenkampskraal should produce significant quantities of some of the first rare 
earths that China will need to import (for example, dysprosium), with the transition 
point perhaps coming in 2014 – or even earlier, given the new domestic production 
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restrictions within China.68   
 
ZANDKOPSDRIFT 
The other major REE site in South Africa is at Zandkopsdrift, some 30km south of 
Garies on the provincial boundary between Northern and Western Cape. This area 
has been explored for mineral potential several times in previous decades, most 
notably in the 1980s by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. In 2008 
the site, together with data relating to previous exploration work, was acquired by 
Frontier Rare Earths. The metallurgy at Zandkopsdrift is rather different from that 
at Steenkampskraal: a carbonite deposit presents greater technical difficulties in 
extraction and separation, with consequent higher costs. Despite this, the project is 
sometimes cited as one of the more promising of current REE developments. Partly 
this arises from its sheer scale. An expected output of 20 000 tonnes a year 
(beginning in 2015) makes it potentially one of the largest REE mines outside China 
– perhaps the largest. A relatively low mineral grade is a problem, although a 
reasonably high proportion of the deposit is of critical metals, particularly europium. 
Thorium is present, but at much lower levels than at Steenkampskraal.  
A major advantage for Frontier has been its partnership agreement with Kores, 
which is expected to acquire a 10% stake in Frontier, 20% of the mine itself and the 
right to purchase up to 40% of the oxides produced there.69 Plans have been mooted 
for a separation plant to be built at Saldanha Bay, although few details are currently 
available. Some analysts suggest that, although Zandkopsdrift has a good chance of 
becoming an operational mine, it may become part of an expected wave of 
consolidation likely to become a feature of the industry in coming years. One 
suggestion is a buy-out by Lynas, which owns the Mount Weld deposit that 
apparently has similar metallurgy to Zandkopsdrift; oxides produced at the latter 
would easily fit into Lynas’s arrangements for separation. If this were to occur it 
would probably mean that separation would take place outside South Africa, at 
Lynas’s plant in Kuantan, Malaysia. An alternative development might be some form 
of merger between Frontier and GWMG.70 
 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE RARE EARTH 
INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
When assessing the likely effects of the developing rare earth industry in South 
Africa, it is important to note that the industry will remain small, if strategically 
important. Although demand looks set to rise in the long run with an increasing 
number of new technologies incorporating REEs, foreign and domestic production 
volumes will still be dwarfed by those of heavyweight mining sectors such as gold or 
platinum. That said, rare earths in South Africa certainly may have significant 
impacts at the local level in terms of employment, the environment and social and 
economic development more generally. 
One estimate suggests that the Steenkampskraal mine may eventually create at least 
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100 jobs, with perhaps 80–100 more at the separation plant.71 Zandkopsdrift should 
produce around four times more than Steenkampskraal, but this does not mean four 
times the jobs. In fact, the former project may be more labour-intensive, since it will 
necessitate mining proportionately larger quantities of mineral resource. Jobs even 
on this relatively small scale would certainly be a boost for a sparsely populated but 
economically deprived region of the country, where the negative effects of high rates 
of unemployment reportedly are evident in a plethora of social problems (see Box 
1).72   
 
 
BOX 1:  Local Impact 
People in the towns closest to the two prospective South African REE mines, 
Bitterfontein and Garies were interviewed concerning the potential impact of the 
new projects along the Western Cape–Northern Cape border. Most were 
cautiously optimistic, welcoming any developments which could help alleviate 
some of the obvious social problems encountered locally. Partly as result of the 
deteriorating fortunes of older mining sectors, many respondents mentioned high 
rates of unemployment and associated alcoholism as particular blights on the 
local community. As one resident commented: 
‘There is nothing for the young men to do here. Once there were jobs in the 
mines. At the station you can see now there is hardly any stone waiting to be 
transported, it used to be full. So the men sit, they do nothing, they drink 
too much, they don’t care anymore.’73  
The railhead of a line beginning in Cape Town and also connecting to the port of 
Saldanha Bay, the town of Bitterfontein once served as a hub for loading stone 
and ores on trains for transport south but has suffered economic decline in 
recent years. Previously, most of the freight was granite for export especially to 
Italy, but the strength of the rand in 2010 and early 2011 brought waning 
fortunes. The location of Bitterfontein and Garies along the major N7 road route 
brings some tourists; some are also attracted by the flower season in late August 
and September, although the fact that the area is only a few hours’ drive from 
Cape Town limits the number of overnight guests. The impact of the tourist 
sector seems confined to a handful of guest-houses, with limited economic 
benefits for the majority of the population.  
There was no apparent awareness expressed in personal interviews of plans to 
develop either rare earth mine. Some older residents of Bitterfontein knew that 
there had once been mining at Steenkampskraal, although unsure of what had 
been extracted. Other than one guest-house owner who had hosted engineers 
working on the redevelopment of the mine, no one interviewed knew of plans to 
restart production there. In Garies, closer to Zandkopsdrift, a similar lack of 
knowledge prevailed. When informed of the new mines all responded positively 
to their employment potential.  
The environmental effects of rare earths mining in the region are difficult to 
predict. Certainly, the record of the REE industry in this regard is not promising. 
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It may be unfair to invoke as a precedent the terrible damage done to the 
environment in China by the exploitation of rare earths, as it seems unlikely that 
the same level of negligence would occur in South Africa, given its regulatory 
safeguards; nor are there comparable mines currently operating outside China for 
which environmental information is readily available. Two points of comparison 
appear relevant, however. The first is the earlier incarnation of the Mountain Pass 
mine in California. The mine was forced to close in part due to huge fines arising 
from a series of 60 unreported waste-water spills containing radioactive materials, 
much of which ended up in the nearby Ivanpah Dry Lake. Secondly, radiation 
from the Bukit Merah rare earth separation plant in Malaysia has been blamed for 
a high incidence of birth defects and leukaemia among the local population.74 
Public anger over this has resulted in widespread protests against the building of 
a new plant in Kuantan.75 With so few separation plants outside China, it remains 
to be seen whether Bukit Merah will remain an isolated case. There are certainly 
grounds for concern with regard to South African mines, which lie close to 
Namaqualand National Park and will incorporate separation plants, potentially 
more hazardous than the mining itself. 
Local residents seemed unaware of the risks associated with radioactive waste at 
the mines. It is interesting to contrast this situation with that in Malaysia, where 
large-scale protest, influenced by the Bukit Merha case, has halted construction 
of Lynas’s new separation plant in Kuantan.76 As regards the new South African 
operations, more objections may be raised as the projects develop and knowledge 
of them becomes more widespread; although the desperate need for jobs may 
well mute any protests. 
 
The companies involved insist that the mines will observe the most stringent 
international safety standards and threats to the mines arising from environmental 
problems do not seem to worry either them or their investors. Concerns tend rather 
to centre on political risk, especially the possible nationalisation of mines.77 Jim 
Engdahl, CEO and president of GWMG, has argued that nationalisation is simply 
‘part of the normal political discourse’ in South Africa and is unlikely to come about. 
In any case, he feels that nationalisation of rare earth mines would make little sense, 
given the lack of profit to be made at the point of extraction and the requirement of 
a foreign partner for the technical knowledge needed to process beyond the ore 
stage.78 While the latter point is valid, examples of governments looking to work 
directly with foreign partners in the exploitation of nationalised resources are 
becoming more common; hence nationalisation would not necessarily exclude such 
arrangements in the South African case.  
One high-profile example in this regard is that of Bolivia. More than half the world’s 
known reserves of lithium, used in electric car batteries, lie within its borders. The 
Bolivian government is attempting to leverage this resource in negotiations with 
potential partners to ensure that a complete supply chain, up to the manufacture of 
lithium-ion batteries, is built up within the country.79 This situation is somewhat 
different from that of REEs, however, because given Bolivia’s control of most of 
the world’s lithium there are no other sources open to companies wishing to 
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guarantee supplies of lithium on the large scale likely to be needed. By contrast, the 
abundance of possible sites worldwide for rare earth extraction limits the pressure 
that could be placed upon a foreign partner in negotiations aimed at maximising 
developmental outcomes. This applies to any demands to locate further stages of the 
supply chain inside South Africa, and to attempts to increase government revenues 
in the form of taxes and royalties at each stage of the chain. It is by no means clear, 
however, that East Asian parastatals such as Kores would be averse to working with 
a nationalised extractive company rather than a multinational corporation. 
The extent to which rare earths can drive social and economic development at the 
local level is also very difficult to judge. A significant impact on the local area may be 
felt through the 26% stakes held in both Steenkampskraal and Zandkopsdrift by 
BEE trusts, although with little information available as to the nature of these bodies 
the distributional consequences of these income streams are unclear. Revenue 
estimates are extremely difficult given the volatility of rare earth prices, particularly 
in the face of continuing global economic turbulence, and shocks within the sector 
itself such as those now likely to be inflicted by Chinese production shut-downs. 
Some indication of price volatility is shown by the fact that the scoping report 
prepared for the Steenkampskraal project in January 2011 gave an annual revenue 
estimate of $27 million. A rough recalculation of this at prices as of September 2011 
would perhaps more than double it, to $55 million.80  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 
Out of the complex political economy surrounding the production of rare earths at 
each stage of the supply chain, a picture is emerging of a three-way scramble that will 
largely determine the future of the industry. First, Chinese officials talk openly of 
their hope that under current supply conditions, Japanese hi-tech REE 
manufacturers, particularly in the magnets sector, will relocate some of their 
production – and thus their technologies – to China.81 As noted above, this process 
is beginning, although it remains doubtful whether China can use its upstream 
dominance to dismantle the Japanese REE industry in the way it did that of the US 
in the 1990s. At that time, whether through an ideological commitment to a global 
free market or simple short-sightedness, the US government was unconcerned with 
the loss of its rare earths industry. Today, belated recognition that rare earths are 
geo-strategically important makes Chinese moves more likely to be viewed with 
something approaching hysteria than with the complacency of the past.  
The entrants in the race that garner most attention are non-Chinese sources of rare 
earths. It seems inevitable that China’s share of the global market for REOs and ores 
will decline rapidly towards the middle of the present decade, as non-Chinese mines 
begin to come online at significant production levels. In the intervening years, 
however, China has a window through which to make its play for the greater prize 
of downstream dominance. On present demand projections China must in any case 
begin importing REOs within, perhaps, two to five years. By acting now, Beijing can 
take advantage of its final years of upstream monopoly and in the process clean up 
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and regulate what has been an environmentally debilitating industry. In effect, large 
parts of the ‘dirty’ side of the supply chain will be exported, in exchange for a greater 
share of the high-revenue, hi-tech ‘clean’ end of the industry. 
The final element of the scramble is the least predictable. High spot prices for REEs 
and the expectation of continued medium-term pressure on supply act as spurs to 
destruction of demand wherever possible. A new level of international co-operation 
is evolving on research into alternatives for rare earths, while elsewhere 
manufacturers are learning to be more efficient in using them. Despite the huge 
sums spent, especially by the Japanese government and allied firms, it remains 
unclear how much substitution of rare earths is possible without losses in 
performance, and how long are the development times for these posited new 
technologies. 
It may well be that a new process or material is discovered that would seriously 
undermine the need for REE in a crucial sector such as magnets. It may equally be 
the case that for the foreseeable future the unique properties of the rare earths will 
continue to make them indispensable. Just as with the conditions that set this 
scramble in motion, however, the ultimate result is likely to be complicated and 
somewhat messy, with no clear winner emerging. Instead, though undoubtedly we 
are now entering a new phase for the industry, the global rare earths sector is likely 
to remain keenly contested for some time to come.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA OF THE CHINESE 
MONOPOLY 
South Africa possesses relative advantages over many of its competitors in rare earth 
extraction. Although it lacks specialised knowledge, a workforce with a long tradition 
in mining is available, regionally and nationally, at lower cost than in countries such 
as Canada or Australia. It is true that South Africa faces challenges in expansion 
programmes for mining potentially critical metals such as manganese, particularly in 
road and rail freight capacity; but no such problems are anticipated for rare earths 
due to the much smaller tonnages involved. Production bottlenecks such as erratic 
or inadequate electricity generation are also less troublesome owing to the smaller 
scale of production, despite the relatively energy-intensive nature of the REE 
separation process. The two mines now under development are globally significant, 
Steenkampskraal for its high material grade and quick development time and 
Zandkopsdrift for the sheer scale of its projected output and the concentrations of 
some critical REEs. Both seem likely to become operational mines and in some 
form to survive the current volatility of the rare earths sector.  
One aspect important to local development is beneficiation. The more stages of the 
production process that can be carried out on South African territory, the better the 
outcome in terms of revenue, added value and employment. At a minimum it would 
appear important that separation is handled in South Africa. It is the first stage of 
the supply chain at which stand-alone production becomes commercially viable, 
given a market for separated oxides. Indeed, should a South African separation 
industry develop, the potential exists for that country to become a regional hub for 
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rare earth ores from other African countries that may not possess the necessary 
resources to separate ores. It is interesting to note that Frontier’s joint venture 
partner Kores also has an interest in the Wigu Hill REE project in Tanzania 
controlled by Vancouver-based Montero Mining & Exploration Ltd, and is looking 
to expand further across the continent. The planned South African separation plant, 
to be jointly built by Kores and Frontier, will have a capacity equal to the expected 
output from Zandkopsdrift, hence expansion would be needed should separation of 
ores from other mines take place. The GWMG-GQRE plant, however, will be 
designed with extra capacity in mind from the start.  
Whether it will be possible to site further stages of production within South Africa 
remains to be seen. In an interview with Mining Weekly, Frontier Rare Earths 
Chairman James Kenny raised the possibility of exploring the options of alloy and 
magnet manufacturing in South Africa jointly with Kores and other potential 
partners.82 Should this happen it is possible that some domestic customers would be 
available, which would link the two ends of the REE supply chain. For example, 
Cape Town-based Optimal Energy Pty is in the late stages of producing the 
country’s first electric vehicle, the Joule, initially for the domestic market.83 Wind 
turbines will also soon be manufactured at Saldanha Bay.84 Concerns over the 
environmental impact of mines, therefore, must also be judged against the 
contribution that REEs may make to South African clean-tech industries.  
Certainly, at the present time and notwithstanding legitimate environmental issues, 
rare earths have the potential to make a small but significant contribution to South 
Africa’s socio-economic development.  
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